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Lilly v. Virginia
119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999)
L Facts
The defendant, Benjamin Lee Lilly ("Lilly"), petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of
Virginia's decision affirming his capital murder conviction and death sen-
tence for the murder of Alexander V. DeFilippis ("DeFilippis").' The
murder of DeFilippis was one of the final events of a crime spree fueled by
drugs and alcohol undertaken by Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly ("Mark"), and
Mark's roommate, Gary Wayne Barker ("Barker"), over a two-day period.
The men abducted DeFilippis, stole his car, and one of the men shot him.2
Upon apprehending the men, the police questioned them separately.
In the midst of interrogation, the police asked questions encouraging Mark
to name Lilly as the'triggerman and stated that unless Mark "broke 'family
ties, [Lilly] 'may be dragging [him] right into a life sentence. "' During the
course of questioning, Mark admitted his participation in most of the
crimes, but specifically named Lilly as the triggerman in the murder of
DeFilippis. At Lilly's trial, Mark was called by the Commonwealth to
testify. Mark refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination." The Commonwealth then offered Mark's
recorded statement that contained his confession and named his brother as
triggerman. Although the statement was hearsay, the trial court admitted
it as a declaration of an unavailable witness against the declarant's penal
interest. The trial court rejected Lilly's objection that this admission vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.'
1. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1998). For more detailed facts of the
underlying case, see Matthew Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 207 (1998) (analyzing
Lilly, 499 S.E.2d 522).
2. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1892 (1999).
3. Id. at 1892 (citation omitted).
4. Id. at 1892-93. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution reads, in relevant part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself .... " Mark was able to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege because he had not yet been tried for his participation in the crime spree. If Mark
had taken the stand to testify regarding Lilly's actions in the murder, he would have been
placed in a position in which he could be questioned regarding his own guilt. These state-
ments could then have been used against him in later proceedings.
5. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1893. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment reads,
in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
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On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Lilly's
conviction and sentence. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Virginia
concluded that the trial court correctly admitted Mark's statement into
evidence as a statement against penal interest. The court rejected Lilly's
claim that admission of Mark's statement violated the Sixth Amendment.6
In so doing, the court relied on White v. Illinois,' in which the United States
Supreme Court stated that "[w]here the proffered hearsay has sufficient
guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied."' The court further
concluded that statements against penal interest of an unavailable witness are
admissible as within a "firmly rooted" objection. The court also found that
the facts of the case proffered guarantees of reliability.9
I. Holding
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision
of the Supreme Court of Virginia. In its plurality opinion, the Court held
that the admission of Mark's statement violated Lilly's Confrontation
Clause rights. The Court remanded the case to the Virginia courts for
harmless error review.
10
III Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Analysis ly the Court
The plurality opinion first noted the right of the accused, in all criminal
prosecutions, to be confronted with the witnesses against him under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
1
confronted with the witnesses against him .... "
6. Lilly, 499 S.E.2d at 534.
7. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
8. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
9. Lilly, 499 S.E.2d at 534. The court felt that the statement was reliable when
considered in context because (1) "Mark Lilly was cognizant of the import of his statements
and that he was implicating himself as a participant in numerous crimes," and (2) "elements
of [his] statements were independently corroborated" by other evidence offered at trial. Id.
Also in that opinion, but not considered by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Virginia found the admission of testimony that Lilly refused to submit to gunpowder residue
tests and the admission of portions of the medical examiner's report to be harmless error in
light of other evidence admitted at trial. This other evidence consisted of (1) Barker's
testimony naming Lilly as the triggerman, (2) Chief Whitsett's testimony of his conversation
with Lilly in which he had asked Lilly what a murderer looked like, to which Lilly allegedly
replied "me,* (3) dried blood on the back of Lilly's pant leg, and (4) Mark's statement. Id. at
535-36. Lilly's petition for writ of certiorari with respect to his Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause issue was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Lilly, 119 S. Ct.
at 443.
10. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1901.
11. Id. at 1893. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
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This right exists in order to ensure the reliability of evidence used in crimi-
nal prosecutions by subjecting it to the adversarial process, including cross-
examination.12 In order to assess whether Lilly's Sixth Amendment right
was violated by the admission of Mark's statement at trial, the Court used
the two-pronged test for hearsay admissibility which it created in Ohio v.
Roberts.'
The Roberts test provides that the admission of hearsay does not violate
the Confrontation Clause if it (1) falls under a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion or (2) has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.14 Applying the
first prong of this test, the Court in Lilly recognized that accomplice state-
ments do not fall within a "firmly rooted" exception to-the hearsay rule
merely because portions of the confession may incriminate the accomplice
himself and, in that respect, may be "against penal interest.""5 The Court
noted that classifying statements simply as "against penal interest" yielded
a class of statements that would be too numerous for meaningful Confronta-
tion Clause analysis. 6 Specifically, the Court stated that, in order to ade-
quately ascertain whether the statement falls within a firmly rooted excep-
tion, courts must undertake further examination of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence specific to the type of statement within the "against penal interest"
umbrella. 7
The Court concluded that there are three situations in which litigants
attempt to use statements against penal interest: (1) voluntary admissions
against the declarant; (2) exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant
claiming that the declarant committed or was a participant in the offense;
and (3) evidence offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt of an
alleged accomplice of the declarant."5 The Court affirmed the validity of
allowing the first type of statements into evidence when the declarant is the
sole defendant. 9 The Court recognized that the second situation involves
statements introduced by a defendant to exculpate himself; the defendant's
12. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894.
13. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
14. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
15. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1899.
16. Id. at 1895.
17. Id. at 1894-98.
18. Id. at 1895.
19. Id. at 1895-96. The Court here discussed the problem initially addressed by the
Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), in which two codefendants, Bruton and
another, were tried jointly and convicted. The confession of Bruton's non-testifying
codefendant was admissible against the codefendant, but the jury was instructed not to use
it in considering the guilt of Bruton. Despite this instruction, the Court found that the threat
to Bruton's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights entitled him to a new trial. The
Court in Lilly further noted how, in more recent post-Bruton cases, it has found the classifica-
tion of an accomplice's confession as a statement against penal interest inadequate to admit
the statement against another person. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1896.
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Sixth Amendment confrontation rights are not implicated by his introduc-
tion of the declarant's statement because it is, of course, the defendant's own
choice to introduce it.20 The Court then considered the third category of
statements against penal interest, the category into which Mark's statements
fit.21. The Court noted that this category of hearsay is inherently unreliable.
The Court stated that its cases have clearly and consistently viewed state-
ments of an accomplice which shift or spread the blame to a defendant as
outside the realm of trustworthy hearsay; thus, the Court found them not
to fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
22
-Referring to the second Roberts factor for admissibility of this type of
hearsay, the Court evaluated whether it was convinced that "the declarant's
truthfulness is so dear from the surrounding circumstances that the test of
cross-examination would be of marginal utility."23 The Court emphasized
that statements of this type are especially suspect and are carefully evaluated
for validity and reliability. 24 The reliability indicia advanced by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in this case were summarily dismissed as non-
persuasive and insufficient to overcome the presumption of unreliability. 5
B. Implications for Lilly
The Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia for
harmless error review, which was probably complicated by the Supreme
20. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1896. The Court did recognize that these statements would be
admissible if the circumstances surrounding them provided assurance of reliability. Id.
21. Id. at 1897. The concurrence in judgment by Chief Justice Rehnquist points out
that the labeling of Mark's statements as "against penal interest" was not completely valid
since. the sections implicating Lilly were "quite separate in time and place" from the state-
ments against Mark's penal interest. Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 1897-98. It is important to note what this case does not stand for. Not all
confessional statements by accomplices which implicate other actors in the criminal activity
are barred from evidentiary admission. The presumption that statements of this type are
"inherently unreliable" may be overcome by proof of indicia of reliability and trustworthi
ness. Id at 1900.
23. Id. at 1900 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1900. The Court found the fact that other evidence corroborated the
statements was wholly irrelevant as the reliability of the declarant is in no way dependent
upon or causally related to the other evidence presented at trial. The Court further found
unpersuasive the fact that Mark's Miranda warnings were read to him prior to giving his
statement because the motivation to spread the guilt for a crime is not extinguished by the
reading of such rights. Id. The Court was equally unpersuaded by Mark's awareness of the
criminal consequences of his statement, since the statement given was not wholly against
Mark's penal interest, but instead contained statements which shifted the guilt for the capital
crime to Lilly. The Court found these proffered indicia of reliability insufficient to meet the
burden needed to overcome Lilly's right of confrontation. Lastly, the Court noted the




Court of Virginia's earlier findings of harmless error. At Lilly's trial,
Barker's testimony and Mark's statement identified Lilly as the triggerman.26
In addition, the Commonwealth also introduced the following items of
evidence: (1) Chief Whitsett's testimony that Lilly said a murderer looked
like "me" (Lilly); (2) testimony that Lilly refused to submit to a gunpowder
residue test; (3) dried blood on the back of Lilly's trousers; and (4) portions
of a medical examiner's report.27 The admissibility of Barker's statement
was never questioned. Each of the other items of evidence was admitted
over Lilly's objection. In its original opinion, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia found Mark's statement admissible." The court also held that evidence
about the blood on the back of Lilly's trousers was admissible although the
blood had never been tested even to determine its human origin."' It was
against this background that the court evaluated the gunpowder residue
evidence and medical examiner's report. The court assumed that Lilly's
refusal to submit to the gunpowder residue test was inadmissible, but held
its admission harmless error in light of the admissible evidence already in the
case.3" Essentially the same holding was applied to the medical examiner's
report.1
In conducting the harmless error review mandated by the United States
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Virginia had to first determine what
evidence, excluding Mark's statement, was properly admitted into evidence.
It was only against that background that the effect of Mark's statement
could be assessed because harmless error review must be based solely upon
properly admitted evidence. The purpose for conducting harmless error
review is to assess whether a new trial is warranted due to the effect, if any,
of erroneously admitted evidence on the verdict. In order to make this
assessment, courts look to the other evidence proffered by the Common-
wealth during trial. If a court were to look to all evidence admitted at trial,
including erroneously but harmlessly admitted evidence, a case hypotheti-
cally could contain all erroneously admitted evidence, each piece of which
seemed harmless when considered in light of the other pieces of harmlessly
admitted evidence. This does not fulfill the purpose of harmless error
review, which seeks a basis for the conviction within the properly admitted
evidence. Thus, the gunpowder residue evidence and medical examiner's
report, the admissions of which were harmless error when evaluated in light
26. Lilly, 499 S.E.2d at 528-32.
27. Id. at 535-36.
28. Id. at 533-34.
29. Id. at 535-36.
30. Id. at 535.
31. Id. at 536. Lilly challenged the admission of portions of the medical examiner's
report because of references within the report to tests which were not performed by the
proponent of the report. Id.
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of Mark's statement, needed to be excluded from consideration. This left
Barker's testimony, Chief Whitsett's testimony, and the dried blood as the
basis upon which the harmlessness of the admission of Mark's statement had
to be measured. The court needed to find that the admission of Mark's
statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning that it had to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission did not have a
"substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict."
32
The Supreme Court of Virginia released its decision on November 5,
1999.11 The court determined that the admission of Mark's statement was
not harmless error, reversing his conviction for capital murder and the
related firearm charge, and remanding the case for a new trial.' In making
its decision the court recognized both the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard under which harmless error review is to be judged as well as the
importance of tainted evidence in the prosecution's case. The court
emphasized the lack of physical evidence presented by the Commonwealth
to support the finding that Lilly was the triggerman. The court noted that
the evidence advanced by the Commonwealth to support a finding of
harmless error, with the exception of Barker's testimony, only connected
Lilly with the crime spree and participation in the activity leading to
DeFillipis's murder, but not with triggerman activity."' This evidence may
have supported a finding of first degree murder, but it was insufficient to
sustain a conviction for capital murder. The court also recognized that the
familial tie between Mark and Lilly probably increased the credibility of
Mark's testimony in the eyes of the jury.3
On remand for a new trial, Lilly's case is likely to be very different.
Barker's testimony will, of course, be available. Mark, who has been
convicted of his charges39 will no longer be able to claim a Fifth Amend-
ment privilege and will be available to the Commonwealth. However, at
32. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (i946)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Lilly v. Commonwealth, Nos. 972385, 972386 (Va. Nov. 5,1999).
34. Id. The court affirmed Lilly's conviction for the carjacking, robbery, abduction,
and the four related firearm charges. Lilly's counsel conceded that the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to support these charges. The dissenting justices based their argument for
harmless error on these concessions, in that the evidentiary support for these affirmed charges
was the same as that for the reversed charges. These justices argued that if the evidence was
sufficient to support the affirmed charges, it was suffient to support all of the charges. Id.





39. See Michael Hemphill, Killer's Case Reaches Justices - Brother's Confession Led to
Death Sentence, THE ROANOKE TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, at Al.
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his own sentencing hearing, Mark recanted his assertion that Lilly was the
triggerman. ° As for the remaining "incriminating" evidence, the blood on
Lilly's trousers (if the pants are still available for testing) may prove not of
human origin. In addition, the gunpowder residue and medical examiner
evidence may be inadmissible.
C. Implications for Virginia Capital Practice
Implications of this case for general Virginia capital practice are three-
fold. This case holds primary benefit for capital cases in which a defendant
is the alleged triggerman and accomplice statements which spread or shift
guilt are vital to the Commonwealth's case. Section 18.2-18 of the Virginia
Code generally proscribes capital murder convictions and sentences of death
for actors other than the triggerman 1 This exception provides a tremen-
dous incentive for those who try to use the triggerman exception as a
defense by implicating others as the triggerman. Given the ruling in Lilly,
defense counsel should be cognizant of the rights that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees. Should the declarant of any such self-serving statement not be
available to the Commonwealth for testimony, the statements are not
admissible."2 Any objection at the trial level to the admission of a statement
similar to Mark's should be couched in Confrontation Clause terms.
Further, the trisecting by the Court of possible "against penal interest"
situations holds importance if the Commonwealth attempts to place into
evidence statements which do not fall directly within the admissible catego-
ries or meet the requisite indicia of reliability set out for each.
A second import of this case for Virginia is drawn from the Court's
analysis of the second prong of the Ohio v. Roberts test. This discussion
indicated the willingness of the Court to recognize the duty of appellate
courts, including state courts, to undertake seriously their own analysis of
the indicia of reliability in each individual case."3 Hence, should a court
40. Id.
41. The code language, in relevant part, reads as follows: "[E]xcept in the case of a
killing for hire under the provisions of subdivision 2 of S 18.2-31 or a killing pursuant to the
direction or order of one who is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise under the
provisions of subdivision 10 of S 18.2-31, an accessory before the fact orprincipal in the second
degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the
offense were murder in tbe first degree." VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-18 (Micbie 1999) (emphasis
added).
42. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900. Such statements are inadmissibunless the Common-
wealth can independently establish "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" such that
adversarial testing would not significantly add to the statement's reliability per the second
prong of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). However, the Court noted that it is highly
unlikely that the presumptive unreliability attaching to this type of statement can be
effectively rebutted. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900.
43. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900. But see id, 119 S. Ct. at 1905-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(rejecting the analysis of the second Roberts factor due to belief that the Supreme Court of
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violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights by
allowing weak indicia of reliability to justify admission of hearsay, a defen-
dant may seek redress and reconsideration in an appellate court. Further,
due to the Court's recognition of the improbability of satisfying this reliabil-
ity criteria in accomplice hearsay statements of this type, trial and appellate
courts may be less hasty in allowing hearsay of this nature in at trial."
The third implication this decision holds for Virginia capital practice
is the Court's chastisement of the Supreme Court of Virginia for the sub-
standard analysis performed in this case. The Court expressed concern that
"[the Supreme Court of Virginia's] decision represented a significant depar-
ture from [the Court's] Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 4 This case
should alert the Virginia courts in death penalty cases that the United States
Supreme Court will step in to correct state courts when there is such uncon-
stitutional application of the law.'
Kimberly A. Orem
Virginia had not reached a decision on this factor, therefore finding remand for this consider-
ation a more appropriate remedy).
44. Id. at 1900.
45. Id. at 1893.
46. See also William S. Geimer, Two Decades of Death: Trashing the Rule of Law in
Virginia, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 293 (1999) (discussing the illogical application of the rule of law in
Virginia capital cases).
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